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Digital operational resilience, as defined by Article 3 of the DORA regulation

In brief

Digital operational resilience is, according to Article 3 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA), the ability of a financial entity to build, assure and review its operational integrity and reliability, including throughout disruptions. Management Square reads this definition and the regulation's five pillars here, separating what the text sets from what it leaves to technical standards.

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Within the meaning of Article 3, point 1, of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, known as DORA, digital operational resilience is “the ability of a financial entity to build, assure and review its operational integrity and reliability”. The entity achieves this, the text continues, by ensuring, “either directly or indirectly through the use of services provided by ICT third-party service providers”, the full range of capabilities needed to address the security of the network and information systems it uses, “including throughout disruptions”. ICT stands for information and communication technologies.

The notion therefore comes from a financial sector text, applicable since 17 January 2025 (Article 64). The regulation organises it into five pillars, which follow its Chapters II to VI: ICT risk management, incidents, testing, third-party provider risk, information sharing. Outside the entities covered by its Article 2, the expression is a matter of usage, without the scope the regulation gives it.

Here we read the consolidated version published by the Publications Office of the European Union, consulted on 12 November 2026, which incorporates the French corrigenda of 25 October 2024 and 30 July 2025.

Digital operational resilience, read word by word

The first key word of the definition is “ability”: the regulation describes neither a state achieved once and for all nor a file to be produced. In our reading, an ability is observed when it is called upon, which sheds light on the place the text gives to testing.

Then come three verbs: build, assure, review. The third finds an echo in Article 6(5): the ICT risk management framework is reviewed at least once a year, periodically for microenterprises, and upon the occurrence of a major incident.

The words “directly or indirectly” bring providers into the definition itself. Article 28(1) sets out the corresponding principle: financial entities that use ICT services “shall, at all times, remain fully responsible” for complying with their obligations.

The end of the sentence names the purpose: the capabilities concerned support “the continued provision of financial services and their quality”. Network security serves the continuity and quality of the service provided, even on the days when a component has failed.

A notion written for financial entities

Article 2(1) lists twenty categories of financial entities, in points (a) to (t): credit institutions, investment firms, insurance and reinsurance undertakings, management companies, among others. Point (u) adds ICT third-party service providers, which the definition does not cover in its own right: it speaks of the ability “of a financial entity”.

Article 4 adjusts the requirements according to the entity’s size, its overall risk profile and the complexity of its activities: this is the principle of proportionality. Article 16 reserves a simplified framework for the entities it lists.

A company not listed in Article 2 that speaks of its digital operational resilience borrows the word from the regulation, without falling within its scope. Other texts have their own vocabulary: the NIS2 directive speaks of cybersecurity and risk management; our article on the differences between DORA and NIS2 describes how the two texts fit together.

ICT risk and incidents, Chapters II and III

According to Article 5, which opens Chapter II, the management body “shall define, approve, oversee and be responsible for the implementation” of the ICT risk management framework, and it bears “the ultimate responsibility” for this management. Article 6 places within this framework a “digital operational resilience strategy”.

Articles 8 to 14 then set out a cycle, readable in their headings: identification, protection and prevention, detection, response and recovery, backup and restoration, learning and evolving, communication. ICT business continuity plans and response and recovery plans are tested at least once a year (Article 11(6)). “Recovery time and recovery point objectives” are determined for each function (Article 12(6)): common usage calls them RTO and RPO.

Chapter III deals with incidents. Article 18 requires them to be classified according to six criteria, including the duration of the incident and the criticality of the services affected. Article 19 requires major incidents to be reported to the competent authority: initial notification, intermediate report, then final report. Article 3, point 10, calls major an incident that has “a high adverse impact” on the network and information systems that support critical or important functions.

Testing and third-party providers, Chapters IV and V

Article 24 requires financial entities, other than microenterprises, to have a “sound and comprehensive” digital operational resilience testing programme. Systems and applications supporting critical or important functions are all tested at least once a year.

Article 26 adds, solely for entities designated by their authority, threat-led penetration testing, at least every three years, on live production systems. In the French version, the expression “test d’intrusion” comes from the corrigendum of 25 October 2024, which substituted it for “test de pénétration” throughout the regulation.

In Chapter V, Article 28 requires a register of information on all contractual arrangements for ICT services and, for services supporting critical or important functions, exit strategies. Articles 29 and 30 deal with concentration risk and contractual provisions. From Article 31 onwards, a second section places under oversight the providers that the European supervisory authorities designate as critical.

Information sharing, an option opened by Chapter VI

Chapter VI contains only one article, Article 45, whose verb is “may”: financial entities may exchange cyber threat information and intelligence among themselves. The exchange must aim to enhance their digital operational resilience, take place “within trusted communities of financial entities” and rely on arrangements that protect the information shared. Entities notify their participation to their competent authority.

The points the regulation leaves to technical standards

The regulation sets the obligations and delegates part of their detail to technical standards, prepared by the European supervisory authorities and adopted by the Commission.

Pillar Detail left to technical standards Article making the referral
ICT risk management Elements to include in security policies, procedures and tools; content of the simplified framework Art. 15 and 16
Incidents Thresholds that make an incident major; timescales, content and templates of reports Art. 18 and 20
Testing Scope and methodology of threat-led penetration testing, use of internal testers Art. 26
Third-party providers Templates for the register of information; elements to assess when subcontracting a service that supports a critical or important function Art. 28 and 30

Article 45, on information sharing, contains no referral of this kind. It is in these standards that you will find, for example, the threshold for reporting an incident and the deadline for doing so. Our article DORA in banking reads two of them, for what they require of an IT project; we do not summarise them here.

The three verbs of Article 3 lend themselves to a review, critical function by critical function: what has been built, what a test has verified, the date of the last review. Our page on cyber resilience describes how these capabilities are built with the business and put to the test through exercises. Whether an entity or a contract falls within the scope of the regulation remains a legal analysis, to be carried out on the version of the text in force.

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FAQ

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Another question? Ask us

How does the DORA regulation define digital operational resilience?

Article 3, point 1, of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 sees it as the ability of a financial entity to build, assure and review its operational integrity and reliability. This ability covers everything needed for the security of the network and information systems on which the continued provision and quality of financial services depend, including throughout disruptions. It applies whether the entity acts with its own resources or through ICT third-party service providers.

Does digital operational resilience concern a company outside the financial sector?

The term is defined by Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, which applies to the financial entities listed in its Article 2 and to the ICT third-party service providers covered by the same article. A company in another sector may use it by convention, to refer to its ability to maintain its digital services during a disruption, without that use making the regulation applicable to it. Other texts may concern it, such as Directive (EU) 2022/2555, known as NIS2, in the terms of national law. Determining the applicable text is a matter for legal analysis.

What is the difference between digital operational resilience and cyber resilience?

Digital operational resilience is a term defined by a European financial sector regulation, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, which attaches obligations to it. Cyber resilience is a term of common usage: we use it for the ability of an organisation, whatever its sector, to continue its essential activities during a digital incident, then return to normal. The two expressions address the same concern; for financial entities, the first carries the requirements written in that regulation.

Who is responsible for digital operational resilience in a financial entity?

Article 5(2) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 makes the management body responsible for defining, approving and overseeing the ICT risk management framework, and holds it accountable for it. The same article assigns it the approval of the digital operational resilience strategy and the allocation of the corresponding budget. Using a provider does not shift this responsibility: under Article 28, the financial entity remains fully responsible for complying with its obligations.

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