The first hours of a major cyberattack are rarely lost for lack of technical skills. They are lost looking for who has the authority to isolate a network, how to bring management together when email is down, and who must alert which authority. Cyber crisis management is the organisation that settles these questions before they arise.
It makes it possible to decide, contain the attack and inform when the usual processes are no longer enough. It unfolds in three phases. Before, a set-up is built and exercised. During, two units decide and act, one strategic, the other operational. After, a trusted system is rebuilt and the organisation corrects what the crisis revealed. Each phase produces specific deliverables, for which an identified person is accountable.
Before, during, after: the deliverables of cyber crisis management and who is accountable
| Phase | What it produces | Who is accountable |
|---|---|---|
| Before | Activation criteria, composition of the units, backup directory and means of communication, list of notification obligations, exercises | Senior management for the mandate, the CISO and the business continuity manager for building it |
| During | Log of facts and decisions, containment measures, degraded modes for the business, internal and external messages, notifications | The strategic unit for decisions, the operational unit for execution |
| After | Decision to exit the crisis, rebuilt system, final reports, lessons learnt, action plan | Senior management for the exit, the CIO for rebuilding, each department for its actions |
This breakdown is based on public references. ANSSI publishes a “Cyber crisis management” collection in three volumes: “Organiser un exercice de gestion de crise cyber” (organising a cyber crisis management exercise), “Crise d’origine cyber, les clés d’une gestion opérationnelle et stratégique” (crisis of cyber origin, the keys to operational and strategic management), written in partnership with the CDSE, and “Anticiper et gérer sa communication de crise cyber” (anticipating and managing cyber crisis communication).
Incident or crisis: the threshold that activates the set-up
Not every security incident is a crisis. ANSSI defines a crisis of cyber origin as an immediate and major destabilisation of an entity’s normal operations, due to one or more malicious actions on its digital services and tools. It sees it as a high-impact event that the usual processes cannot handle.
The threshold is therefore written in advance, in terms that the on-call team can recognise: an essential activity at a standstill, a spread that the team no longer controls, data that has left the system, an attacker who contacts the press or customers. The people authorised to activate the set-up are named, with their deputies. Below the threshold, the incident follows the routine process, as described on our SRE and observability page.
Before the crisis: a set-up built, then exercised
The mandate. Senior management approves the set-up and plays a role in it. Article 20 of the NIS2 directive entrusts management bodies with approving cybersecurity risk management measures, among which Article 21 cites crisis management. For financial entities, Article 11 of the DORA regulation requires a crisis management function, except for microenterprises; small entities under the simplified framework of its Article 16 are subject to lighter requirements.
The two units. The strategic unit arbitrates: senior management, business departments, legal, communications, human resources, data protection officer. The operational unit executes: CIO, CISO, operations, providers. Their composition, their deputies and how they liaise are written down.
The resources. A printed directory, a communication channel independent of the information system, a meeting place, offline access to documents. Contracts are also read in calm conditions: incident response provider, insurer, legal counsel.
The decisions prepared. Who can cut internet access or stop a production line? What is the position in principle on a ransom demand? Which authority should be alerted, within what timescale, under whose signature? An answer found during the crisis costs hours.
The exercises. From the tabletop scenario to the simulation that mobilises the technical teams, each exercise produces a list of gaps and actions that are followed up. Finally, the set-up rests on business continuity and recovery plans, whose construction and testing fall within our cyber resilience offer.
During the crisis: decide, contain, inform
The first step is to open a log: facts, decisions, authors, timestamps. It serves as shared memory, as the basis for reports and as evidence.
The operational unit pursues three objectives: contain the attack, understand its extent, preserve the traces. Rebuilding too early erases the logs that the investigation needs and exposes the organisation to a second compromise.
The strategic unit decides what technology cannot decide alone: stopping an activity or continuing it in degraded mode, choosing the order of recovery with the business, validating each message. It also protects the technical teams: situation updates at fixed times replace continuous requests.
Communication follows a single line, held by a designated spokesperson: employees first, then customers, partners and, if necessary, the public. A cyber crisis lasts. ANSSI counts the length of the exit from crisis among its specific features: relief shifts are planned from the first days.
The notifications that run during the crisis
While the teams contain the attack, legal deadlines have started to run.
| Text | What is notified | Recipient | Timescale provided by the text |
|---|---|---|---|
| Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2), Article 23 | Significant incident at an essential or important entity | CSIRT (computer security incident response team) or competent authority | Early warning within 24 hours of becoming aware of it, incident notification within 72 hours, final report no later than one month after that notification |
| Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA), Article 19 | Major ICT-related incident at a financial entity | Competent authority | Initial notification, intermediate report then final report, within timescales set by the technical standards provided for in Article 20 |
| Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR), Article 33 | Personal data breach, unless it is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of individuals | Supervisory authority | Without undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after having become aware of it |
Three clarifications. NIS2 is a directive: its obligations apply in the terms of national law. Article 34 of the GDPR adds a communication to the data subjects when the breach is likely to result in a high risk. Finally, the same incident may fall under several texts at once, for example the GDPR and NIS2. For a financial entity, the DORA provisions on ICT risk management and incident notification apply in place of those of NIS2.
The 24-hour and 72-hour deadlines start from awareness. The log must therefore date that moment unambiguously. Filing a complaint and notifying the insurer also have their deadlines, to be noted before the crisis. The legal qualification of your situation belongs to your lawyers.
After the crisis: leave crisis mode, rebuild, learn
Exiting the crisis is a decision of the strategic unit, taken on criteria: attacker evicted, essential activities resumed, enhanced monitoring in place. It marks the move to project mode.
Rebuilding is that project. ANSSI devotes a body of guidance, “Cyberattaques et remédiation” (cyberattacks and remediation), to remediation, which it presents as all the operations aimed at regaining control of the compromised information system and restoring a sufficient operating state. It lasts well beyond the crisis and requires a lead, a budget and an order of priority set by the business.
The final reports due to the authorities are drafted from the log. Lessons learnt concern organisation as much as technology: time to activation, quality of decisions, flow of information. For financial entities, Article 13 of DORA requires a review after any major ICT-related incident that has disrupted their core activities. Each action has an owner and a deadline, and the crisis set-up is updated.
The first step fits in one line of the diary: the date on which your management will play a tabletop scenario, log open and backup resources to hand.